Various causal details of the genetic process of translation have been singled out to account for its privileged status as a "code". We explicate the biological uses of coding talk by characterizing a class of special causal processes in which topological properties are the causally relevant ones. This class contains both the process of translation and communication theoretic coding processes as special cases. We propose a formalism in terms of graphs for expressing our theory of biological codes and discuss its utility in understanding biological systems.
Introduction
Molecular biology is pervaded by talk of coding and information (Sarkar 1996; Maynard Smith 2000) . For example, the process of translation⎯the causal process leading from RNA to primary protein structure⎯is almost always discussed explicitly in terms of a "code," often because of the special causal role played by RNA in the process. At the same time, the particular content of that talk is often deeply ambiguous. In the case of translation, a variety of details have been singled out to account for its privileged status.
Maynard Smith (2000) , for instance, suggests that translation is distinguished from other causally specific processes by the "arbitrariness" of the correspondence between codons and amino acids (though see (Godfrey-Smith 2000a) ). In a similar vein, Godfrey-Smith (2000a; 2000b) argues that translation is unusual because of two aspects of the causal relation. First, the mechanisms by which an mRNA causes a protein to be produced are insensitive to any "direct" (Godfrey-Smith 2000a, 204) chemical affinities between codons and amino acids; any codon could (in a "chemical possibility" sense) be paired with any amino acid given an appropriate tRNA mediator. Second, the specification of protein primary structure from the sequence of mRNA monomers is in accord with a "combinatorial rule" (Godfrey-Smith 2000a, 204) that functions roughly as a locality constraint on the RNA → protein mapping: the primary structure of a segment of protein depends only on the structure of a corresponding small segment of RNA. More recently, Šustar (2007) has emphasized this locality condition, claiming that the causal role of DNA in protein production is privileged because local perturbations of a DNA molecule-e.g., a single base substitution-produce strictly local perturbations in the primary structure of the protein it causes.
All of these proposed conditions are, in important ways, vague. Moreover, even if they can be made sufficiently precise, it is unclear whether they offer anything more than a redescription of translation; a theory of coding should not simply be a restatement of the canonical case of biological coding. And even if one or all of these criteria serve to distinguish on independent grounds translation from processes such as glycolysis, no account is offered as to why such properties imply that translation is a code. Our central goal here is to argue for a particular explication of (at least) the biological uses of coding talk that is not subject to these concerns. In particular, we provide a precise characterization of a class of special causal processes that contains communication theoretic coding processes as a special case, as well as the canonical example of coding in molecular biology.
Topological Causation
We focus on biochemical processes that potentially warrant identification with codes, and in particular, on processes that result in the production of some macromolecule. In general, to say that some property P of an object is causally relevant in a process is to say that a potential manipulation of the value of P results in a different effect produced after introduction of the object at the start of the causal process under consideration. This account of causal relevance is closely related to the interventionist characterization of direct causation found in Woodward (2003) , but is intended only to pick out one feature of causation, not provide a definition of it (see also (Eberhardt and Scheines 2006; Woodward and Hitchcock 2003) or physical properties (e.g. mass) of the reactant results in little or no change in the outcome of the process. Of course, most biological processes are not based on topological causation: in enzyme catalyzed hydrolysis, for example, the details of enzyme mass and charge distribution determine which substrate it interacts with and which bonds are 1 This term does not refer to the "rubber-sheet geometry" of algebraic topology, which is concerned with the invariant properties of donuts and coffee cups and other continuous topological spaces. By 'topological properties' we mean to refer strictly to a relation of adjacency that holds amongst a finite, discrete set of elements, particularly things like atoms in a molecule. As early as 1955, Rashevsky was explicitly using "topological" in this sense when speaking of molecular structure. This usage is currently standard in the field of chemical graph theory (Pogliani 2000) , which is also called "molecular topology" (Diudea, Gutman, and Jantschi 2001, 1) .
cleaved; the "lock and key" model of enzyme action explicitly emphasizes the causal primacy of geometry; and so on. We argue, however, that causal dependence upon topology is exactly the relevant feature for a process to be potentially a code in (something like) the classical communication theory (CT) sense of the term.
As an illustration of topological causation, consider the case of translation. If the transcript to be translated is any moderately large mRNA molecule, then it will typically fold into a more compact and complex structure than a simple chain. One particularly common structure, formed through intramolecular base pairing, is the RNA "hairpin." In a hairpin, two distant segments of a single RNA strand stick together, resulting in the formation of a loop between them. Under normal cell conditions, the stability of a typical hairpin structure depends on the ambient cytosolic salt concentration. In vitro, the same is true; salt concentration determines the conformation of the RNA and one can force either the hairpin or chain-like geometry to dominate. In the case of in vitro translation of mRNA transcripts using a cell-free system 2 , salt concentration may be changed (within limits) without adversely affecting translation accuracy (though translation rates may suffer).
Suppose then that we have an mRNA transcript, M, which causes the production of some protein P under conditions in which our in vitro translation system functions "normally"
(produces consistent polypeptide products, etc.). Suppose further that the transcript M 2 A cell-free system is simply a solution of the components of the translation system maintained in a test-tube rather than a living cell.
6 maintains either a hairpin or chain-like conformation depending on salt concentration.
We can now test the assertion that the set of neighborhood relations of distinct codons (and not molecular geometry) is the causally relevant factor determining the precise protein product of the process. If we make an appropriate 3 change in a single base of M (by substitution) we can, for a moderately sized hairpin, create a new molecule M' that is effectively identical in geometry to the original M. However, the polypeptide product will be P', a protein differing from P by a single amino acid. An intervention on neighborhood relations alone produces a different outcome. Now suppose that we instead raise the salt concentration to a point at which M is no longer in a hairpin conformation but the other components of the translation apparatus are still capable of functioning. The resulting effect is still production of P; an intervention on geometry alone has no impact on the terminus of the causal chain.
Though we speak of intervening on high-level geometry without altering topology, topological properties are not independent of low-level geometric and physical properties. What is considered a subunit or an adjacency relation will depend on the underlying physics and chemistry of a given system 4 . For instance, in the hairpin example, codons were taken to be coherent subunits, stable objects which can stand in the 3 Because the genetic code is degenerate, not all changes will be causally efficacious. 4 This dependence of topology on low-level physical and geometric properties may in fact be an instance of full-fledged supervenience in some cases or domains. Whether or not it is actually a supervenience relation is irrelevant to both the notion of biological code we develop here, and the question of whether such codes exist.
relation of adjacency to one another; the adjacency relation was based on the presence of a covalent bond between the sugars of distinct codons, and not on hydrogen bonding between the bases. A codon has a particular charge, geometry, etc. that allows it to be distinguished as a subunit, and so the topology of the hairpin depends in some sense on the physical and chemical properties of the things identified as subunits. But the choice of which molecular components constitute subunits and which chemico-physical relations count as neighborhood relations is crucially not arbitrary in many domains. Given the typical energies at which translation occurs, hydrogen bonds are much shorter-lived than covalent bonds, making the latter natural candidates for an adjacency relation. Similarly, atoms and-as we argue below-certain groups of atoms constitute stable and chemically distinct objects that are in some sense natural subunits. This situation is in contrast to the conventionality of the low-level characteristics of subunits and adjacency relations in Importantly, the justification of the undirected graph representation for topological properties of complex molecules makes no reference to coding. Rather, there are independent reasons to suppose that such graphs are faithful representations of relevant neighborhood relations in biological molecules. Atomic nuclei are the smallest stable units capable of chemical recombination. They are neither created nor destroyed in biochemical processes and are, so far as physics is concerned, the smallest objects capable of stable neighborhood relations in a macromolecule. 6 Similarly, covalent and ionic bonds are arguably the basic physical entities that maintain these neighborhood relations between atoms. The motivation for these correspondence rules is thus strictly physical and invokes only chemical and physical concepts. Coding relations are not required by our representation scheme, but arise (if at all) only as a matter of contingent fact.
The Proposed Formalism
Any formal explication of 'biological code' should provide for the unproblematic uses of the term in theoretical and experimental contexts. At the very least, any proposal must imply that the "genetic code" in translation-the correspondence between triplets of RNA and amino acids-is an instance of biological coding. A suitable formalism should also enable inquiry into whether various non-genetic systems in molecular biology instantiate codes. The definition of 'biological code' should not be simply an ad hoc redescription of translation; if it is not at least possible that other, non-genetic causal systems are codes, then the term 'biological code' provides no content beyond the term 'translation.' More generally, this requirement that any formal definition potentially apply to previously unconsidered systems ensures that it can serve a theoretical role in explanation and prediction. This section presents a formal theory of coding that is (a) based on marked, undirected graphs, and (b) satisfies these desiderata for such a term, including a basis in the concept of topological causation. Moreover, as shown later, the classical communication theory of coding emerges as a special case of this framework.
In general, coding is a relation between sets (possibly of infinite cardinality) of objects.
Our particular focus is on sets of graphs that can be defined in terms of (i) potential marked vertices; and (ii) recursive formation rules. 7 A set of graphs S is complete with respect to a set of formation rules and marked vertex types iff S contains all graphs that can be assembled from those vertices using the formation rules (possibly infinitely many applications of formation rules). We define a graphical code to be a mapping⎯either one-one or many-one⎯from a complete set of graphs G A to a not-necessarily-complete set of graphs G B . Such a relation between G A and G B is a code because each graph "source message" in G A corresponds to exactly one graph "code message" in G B . The correspondence rules between biological macromolecules and their graph representations mean that this extended formalism for coding can be immediately applied to biological processes. The resulting definition of coding for biological processes can be stated informally as follows:
A biological code is any relation between two sets of macromolecules A and B that satisfies three conditions:
1. Elements of A induce elements of the set B under normal cell conditions.
2. G A (the set of graphs representing the members of A) is complete relative to formation rules corresponding to actual biological processes.
3. There is a graphical code between G A and G B such that if g a ∈ G A maps to g b
This definition introduces an additional term⎯'induce' in conditions (1) and (3)⎯as shorthand for a particular type of causal arrangement. Suppose that the introduction of some structure a ∈ A initiates a causal chain resulting in the production or presence of any structure in B under normal cell conditions. We say that a induces b ∈ B just when a has this causal role, and it always causes the presence of the particular member b.
Condition (1) in the definition of biological code is thus not as strong as it might seem, since most molecular cell processes can be described in this way. There are, however, various stochastic processes that do not have deterministic outcomes. For instance, in microtubule formation, introduction of the molecules of α-and β-tubulin initiates the production of a microtubule of stochastically determined length. Such processes are excluded by this definition from being biological codes, precisely because there is no definite "message" for which the initiating structure can be said to code. A salient example in which condition (3) fails to hold may be the relation between DNA sequences and mature mRNA transcripts. Because there are often multiple ways in which a given precursor mRNA transcript may be spliced, there are generally multiple mature mRNA transcripts corresponding to a single DNA sequence. The mapping from the set of graphs representing DNA molecules to the set representing mature mRNA transcripts is generally one-many or even many-many.
Clearly, translation is a relation of biological coding between the set of possible mature mRNA transcripts-those that have already been spliced-and the set of polypeptide products. The process of translation satisfies condition (1), since introduction of a particular mRNA transcript into the proper portion of a functioning cell always causes the production of the same polypeptide, if it causes production of anything at all. There are natural correspondence rules for representing the set of all possible mRNA transcripts (including arbitrarily long ones) by a set of graphs, and that set of graphs is complete with respect to the collection of marked vertices representing atoms, and with respect to a set of simple formation rules that model the biochemical facts of transcript production.
Finally, there is a many-one mapping from this complete set of graphs to the set of graphs representing polypeptide products that captures the biological mapping from mRNA transcripts to polypeptides. Use of coding talk in the canonical example⎯the "genetic code"⎯is thus justified according to this definition.
This definition of biological code places no inherent restrictions on which biological processes might be codes. For instance, glycans are complex molecules composed predominantly of linked sugars, and are involved in an enormous array of molecular cell processes. Causal processes involving glycans may potentially provide instances of complex biological coding. Unlike the topological structure of DNA or RNA, the sugar portions of glycans are typically highly branched (Varki et al. 1999) . Furthermore, the effect of introducing a particular glycan into certain signaling reactions appears to be determined by the sequence of simple sugars along multiple branches. Gabius (1997; has argued that the discrete arrangements of groups of short, nearby branches on some glycans constitute a code that determines the signal receptor to which the glycan will bind. If the set of possible glycans is complete with respect to the cellular processes that generate them, then such a system would be an excellent candidate for a code involving non-chain-like molecules. This code would share what we have argued are the essential properties of code relations-namely that sets of molecules are related through topological causation-but would involve macromolecules with more complex subunit relations than those in the chain-like molecules of the genetic code. In particular, coding relations involving glycans cannot be captured using representations based on strings of characters.
The notion of topological causation emphasizes the importance of neighborhood relations amongst distinguishable subunits, but does not specify any necessary scale for the subunits. In the particular case of macromolecules, the most natural correspondence rules provide graphs with vertices for atoms, and edges for the stable bonds between atoms.
While those rules allow for unambiguous application of the definition of biological code without ad hoc decisions about representation, they also sometimes include too much information: namely, the total set of neighborhood relations amongst atoms. In many cases, the relevant set of distinguishable subunits is some larger collection of atoms (e.g. the nucleotide monomers in an RNA polymer). We define a natural alphabet to be any set of subgraphs that can be used to express the graphs in a graph set in terms of "characters" larger than a vertex. Natural source alphabets are the "coarsest" (i.e., with the largest subgraph "characters") natural alphabets in which one can rewrite the graphs of the source set and still preserve the coding relation in which it stands. A natural source alphabet represents the set of subunits⎯possibly much larger than atoms⎯whose largescale neighborhood relations are the causally relevant ones. Given sets of graphs that stand in a coding relation, we have developed reliable, though typically computationally intractable, algorithms for discovering natural source alphabets.
Natural source alphabets are particularly important for biological systems. Once one set of molecules is known to stand in a coding relation with another, the natural source alphabet provides the causally relevant subunits. Representation in terms of natural source alphabets eliminates irrelevant detail and fixes, in some sense, the proper scale at which to model coding processes. They also form a natural basis on which to construct definitions of information applicable to molecular processes.
The notion of 'graphical code' presented here is a generalization of communication theory coding. It is easy to see qualitatively that standard CT coding is a "special case" of graphical coding, since the graph sets containing only linear, chain-like graphs (graphs for which every vertex has no more than two neighbors) are obviously isomorphic to sets of strings. For this restricted collection of graph sets, 'code' corresponds to 8 :
Given a finite alphabet of symbols S = {s 1 , s 2 , …, s n }, a communication theory code is a one-one or many-one mapping from a complete set of strings A to a set of strings B.
The notion of 'graphical code' that we have presented here also emerges immediately if one starts with a standard CT definition of coding, but generalizes to use sets of marked vertices instead of alphabets, and sets of marked graphs instead of sets of strings. Our explication of coding is a conservative extension of the standard communication theory notion of 'code' to allow for the possibility of undirected, marked graphs as the messages. It is the most natural understanding of coding between graphical objects, rather than between strings.
Two objections
Our appeal to classical CT runs counter to a pervasive sentiment in the philosophical literature: namely, that CT is inadequate for understanding codes in biology. At least in part, we think that this categorical rejection could derive from a mistaken conflation of "codes for" and "carries information about." If these two notions are taken to be equivalent, then the so-called "parity thesis" would ipso facto defeat any CT-based theory of coding. The parity thesis is the claim that one cannot use the concept of CT information to pick out a privileged class of bio-molecules. Specifically, Griffiths (2001, 396) suggests that the application of CT to biological systems requires the adoption of a "causal notion of information" derived from Dretske (1981) , and so information is passed between two systems whenever a channel exists between them. This is the case "when the state of one is systematically causally related to the other, so that the state of the sender can be discovered by observing the state of the receiver" (Griffiths 2001, 397) .
Because causal information makes reference only to the causal relations, there is no nonarbitrary way to distinguish between channel conditions (or noise sources) and the signal:
there is parity amongst the set of causally linked systems (i.e., the various biological molecules and cell structures) and so none can be privileged as the information source.
Thus (the argument continues), DNA cannot be viewed as special in carrying information because other factors can just as well be referred to in this way; cell conditions could be the "signal" and DNA the "channel conditions/noise." If biological coding is based on or identical to causal information, then we have no way of determining which biological molecules are "signal" (e.g., presumably DNA) and which are "noise."
In contrast, we take coding to be conceptually more fundamental than information, and aim (in future work) to use the present concept of biological code as the basis for a theory of biological information. In this, we more closely follow Shannon's original approach in developing CT (Shannon 1948) . While it is only implicit in Shannon's definition of a communication system, a channel is partially defined by a set of coding relations: a communication system exists only when a transmitter exists, and a transmitter is defined by the coding relation which it instantiates. Similarly, receivers are defined by the decoding relation that they instantiate. In an abstract communication system, noise in a channel is a source of stochastic errors introduced into the signal. Unlike transmitters, sources of noise (and other channel conditions) do not stand in coding relations with the destination. There is thus an asymmetry in the definition of a communication system that, 20 in all but the most trivial cases, enables us to distinguish the signal from the noise in a principled manner. In Shannon's account, the presence of a coding relation is at least logically independent of whether there is transfer of information, and perhaps even logically prior to it. We agree that parity is a theoretical possibility between two systems that causally influence a third, but deny that all such causal relations fit the abstract schema of a communication system; in practice, we do not get to choose which systems may be viewed as sources and which as channel conditions or noise sources. By requiring that the coding relation hold, some physical systems are privileged as instantiations of communication theoretic transmitters or receivers and parity is brokenthe parity thesis does not preclude a substantive application of communication theory, at least with respect to coding. By appealing to the fact that biological coding relations (which are independently discoverable) characterize the channel but not sources of noise or background conditions affecting the channel, our notion of biological coding might be used to provide a theory of biological information that is immune from concerns over parity.
Having established that there are no prima facie inconsistencies in taking a CT approach, it remains to defend our choice of formal representations. The coding relation holds between sets of objects, and so the fact that those objects are graphs does no work in explaining what a code is. The properties of a code do not depend on the properties of graphs; rather, graphs are used to express the features of a code. In that case, one might object that the formalism could just as easily be developed using some other type of representation, such as strings, and so nothing is really added by this generalization of CT 21 coding. Our justification for graphs is two-fold. First, graphs allow for perspicuous and easily defended correspondence rules between molecules and their appropriate representations. Analogous rules for other representational schemes would necessarily be more complex. For instance, one might consider coding relations using representations of DNA as strings of characters, as in Yockey (1992) . There is, however, no a priori reason to represent DNA as a string of characters, unless one already knows that DNA is There are arguably an infinite number of equivalent representations, and so we claim that one should prefer a representational scheme that has both straightforward correspondence rules, and also clear relationships between properties of the representation and of the represented. A representational scheme that permits one to directly read off properties is a much more useful scheme than one that does not. Graphs are the most natural and, we contend, the most useful such representation.
Conclusion
A standard claim in molecular biology (and philosophy of biology) is that some of the molecules or molecular processes in living cells form a privileged class that can be described, perhaps heuristically, using 'coding' talk. We have argued that these processes are in fact instances of topological causation: casual processes in which the relevant properties are the neighborhood relations of subunits. By representing molecules with marked, undirected graphs, we conservatively extend classical coding theory to formulate a precise definition of biological code that is not ad hoc, that captures the canonical case of translation, and that can substantiate theoretical uses of code terminology in molecular biology. Our theory of biological codes also facilitates the identification of natural source alphabets, the causally relevant subunits involved in a coding process. The implications of natural source alphabets for an information theory of biology are clear: where before only ad hoc reference to the sequence of chain-like polymers was used to justify measures of information in macromolecules, now relevant units of information may be discerned in systems that are isomorphic to part of a communication system in a rigorous 24 sense. This gives both a principled reason why the monomers of DNA should be considered possible states of the source and provides a tool for evaluating information in novel settings. Of course, such an information theory remains to be developed, but the present account gives a principled basis for the language of coding in molecular biology.
Condition (1) ensures that there are "base cases" generated by the formation rules.
Condition (2) implies that at least one of the formation rules is non-trivial, in the sense of both using the input graph, and producing an output graph that is related to the input graph.
Now use the following notation to describe the repeated application of formation rules:
where the σ nj are the members of Σ n . A complete graph set Σ with respect to S and F S is defined as follows:
Given the above definitions, we can now provide a formal statement of the notion of biological coding: The set of molecules A is a code for the set of molecules B if and only if:
(1) Elements of the set A induce elements of the set B under normal cell conditions. Every a ∈ A induces some b ∈ B. In the body of the paper, we argued that this definition generalizes the communication theory account of coding, which is defined on strings. Strings can be represented as graphs in which every vertex has degree less than or equal to two, though one must attend to certain details. Strings are inherently directional, in that they have a start and end: the string "aab" is not identical to "baa". However, the chain-like graphs a-a-b and b-aa are identical. One can straightforwardly represent the directionality of strings by introducing additional elements into the set of marks. For instance, a mark a* can be used to indicate a "left" vertex of type a. If the formation rules and marking function are appropriately designed, then the resulting complete graph set is essentially a complete string set and the classical theory can be recovered.
of V(σ) satisfying condition (1) above. That is, Q is the partition of V(σ) such that every q ∈ Q induces a connected subgraph on V(σ) that is isomorphic to a member of Ν. Then for each q i ∈ Q there is a vertex v i ∈ V(σ Ν ). The vertices of σ Ν are marked and so there is associated with Σ Ν a marking function L: V(σ Ν ) M where M is a finite set containing one element for every member of the natural alphabet Ν. Essentially, each vertex of a graph rewritten in the alphabet Ν is marked with a label indicating which subgraph was replaced by this vertex. The edge set of the new graph is determined via the following rule: if any vertex in q i shares an edge with any vertex in q j≠i ∈ Q then {v i , v j } ∈ E(σ Ν ).
Constructed in this fashion, V(σ Ν ) and E(σ Ν ) define the graph σ Ν ("σ rewritten in Ν").
There is no requirement that distinct graphs in Σ have distinct corresponding graphs in (2) The average number of vertices per graph in the set Σ Ν is as small as possible.
(3) For all σ ∈ Σ, if σ maps to ξ in the code set, then σ Ν maps to ξ and there is no σ' such that σ' Ν = σ Ν and σ' maps to some ξ' ≠ ξ.
